We introduce a general approach for the analysis of a quantum direct communication protocol. The method is based on the investigation of the superoperator acting on a joint system of the communicating parties and the eavesdropper. The introduced method is more versatile than the approaches used so far as it permits to incorporate different noise models in a unified way. Moreover, it make use of a well grounded theory of quantum discrimination for the purpose of estimating the eavesdropper's information gain.
Introduction
One of the main objectives of quantum information theory [10] is to develop new protocols for controlling the networks of quantum processing units connected by quantum channels [7] . This type of networks requires new methods allowing full utilization of the capabilities offered by quantum information processing [12] . Quantum internetworking protocols should be able to exploit the quantum effects, including quantum teleportation, dense coding and quantum direct communication. However, in order to provide efficient methods for the utilization of quantum effects in large scale networks, it is necessary to analyze the robustness of quantum information processing against the errors that occur during the transmission [8] and processing of quantum information [5] .
In this paper we focus on the analysis of the security of quantum ping-pong protocol in the presence of a general form of quantum noise. The ping-pong protocol [2] has attracted a lot of attention as, contrary to quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes, it does not require prior key agreement for confidentiality provision and it is provably asymptotically secure in lossless channels. The theoretical success of the protocol has been closely followed by the experimental implementation and the proof of concept installation has been realized in the laboratory [11] . It has also been shown that the protocol variant based on higher dimensional systems and exploiting dense information coding also share features of the seminal version when some improvements are introduced [13, 16] .
The ping-pong protocol, similarly to other quantum direct communication (QDC) protocols, operates in two modes: a message mode is designed for information transfer and a control mode is used for an eavesdropping detection. Although the ping-pong protocol is asymptotically secure in perfect quantum channels, the situation looks worse in noisy environments when legitimate users tolerate some level of transmission errors and/or losses. If that level is too high compared to the quality of the channel then an eavesdropper can peek some fraction of signal particles hiding himself behind accepted quantum bit error rate (QBER) threshold [14, 17] . Thus the possibility to intercept some part of the message without being detected renders the protocol insecurity. To cope with this problem an additional purely classical layer has been proposed [15] . However the estimation of security improvement offered by that layer heavily depends on observed QBER and the methods of the protocol analysis used so far do not offer mathematical apparatus capable of QBER estimation in noisy channels. The purpose of the presented work is to fill in this gap.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a general description of the ping-pong protocol in the language of density operators. In Section 3 we describe a general model of noise which can be used to describe the errors occurring during the execution of the protocol. In Section 4 we apply the introduced description for the purpose of the security in the passive eavesdropping scenario. Finally, in Section 5 we summarize the presented work and provide concluding remarks.
General description of the ping-pong protocol
Let us consider the seminal version of the ping-pong protocol [2] in which the message and control modes are executed only in computational basis. The communication process is started by Bob, the recipient of information, who prepares an EPR pair
At the same time eavesdropping Eve controls her own system, which is initially described by state |χ E . As the states of Bob and Eve are separated, the density matrix of the whole system reads ρ
Next Bob sends a signal qubit A to Alice. This qubit on its way can be influenced by two factors: quantum noise because of channel imperfection and malicious activities of Eve who may entangle it with the system controlled by herself. Let us assume that Eve is positioned close to Alice, so her action takes place on the qubit modified by the noise. The density matrix of the system just before signal qubit enters the environment controlled by Alice reads
where it has been explicitly highlighted that noise operator N acts only on the EPR pair (I denotes identity operation). Before signal qubit enters Alice's environment, Eve can entangle it with her own system ρ
where entangling operator E AE acts only on qubit A of the EPR pair and system possessed by Eve. At that point of protocol execution Alice can select a control mode which serves for eavesdropping detection or continue in the information mode.
In the former case she measures the received qubit in computational basis, i.e. performs von Neumann measurement using projectors M x,A = I B ⊗ |x A x A | ⊗ I E , x = 0, 1. The probability that she finds qubit under investigation in state |x (measures ±1) is given by
After the measurement the state of the whole system is described by
Subsequently Bob measures his qubit in computational basis using projectors M y,B = |y B y B |⊗ I A ⊗ I E , y = 0, 1. The probability that Bob finds his qubit in state |y provided that Alice has found his qubit in state |x is given by
From the above, it follows that errors in control mode appear with probability
In information mode, Alice encodes a classic bit µ applying (µ = 1) or not (µ = 0) operator Z A to the possessed qubit. The system state after encoding is given by
The qubit A is sent back to Bob after the encoding operation. Eve's task is to discriminate between states ρ µ
BAE with maximal confidence. The system states after Bob's reception of qubit A traveling back from Alice and in the absence of Eve measurements are given by ρ µ
so Bob has to distinguish the states
When Eve performs measurements, the same quantum discrimination strategy is used but Bob is unconscious that measured states are of the form
The analysis of the protocol should determine Eve's information gain I E and the probability of erroneous Bob's decoding QBER as functions of probability of error observed in control mode P EC and, optionally, parameters describing noise operator N .
Model of the noise
Any interaction with the environment observed from the perspective of the principal system can be given as operator sum (Kraus) representation [10, 3] 
Such an approach hides the details of the interaction of the system under investigation with the environment, but these details are not of immediate relevance in analysis of many quantum information processing related tasks. In such situations Kraus representation proved to be useful because it provides a unified description of many, seemingly different, physical processes.
It follows from the description of the protocol operation that the signal qubit only interacts with the environment. If that qubit was separated from the home qubit possessed by Bob, the noise operator would be simply decomposed as N BA = I B ⊗ N A , where N A describes the interaction of the signal qubit with the environment. However, the signal and home qubits are maximally entangled in the ping-pong protocol and such decomposition is not obvious. In this section we introduce a general procedure for deriving Kraus operator for such a situation and exemplify it with the depolarizing channel.
The action of the quantum channel (13) can be represented as a supermatrix M N [9, Eq. (5)]
where Res (·) denotes reshape transformation which maps a density matrix into a column vector row wise. The Kraus operators can be recovered from M N with singular matrix decomposition of the matrix D N which is related to M N via
where k denotes k-th element of the canonical base of ρ space [9] . When two quantum channels N B and N A are applied to the parts of the composite system the supermatrix of the composite channel can be found as
where M R is the matrix representing the change of base in the product space and it is commonly called the reshuffle matrix [9, 1] . In the considered case N B ≡ I B and our task is to derive Kraus operators for M I B ⊗N A and subsequently a map for density operators analogous to (13) . The single qubit depolarizing channel with reliability r, which is commonly used to model white noise, is described by the map [10] 
where σ k are Pauli matrices. The supermatrix of this map is given as 
Using the formula (16), one gets the explicit form of the supermatrix for the extended channel 
Kraus operators for the above extended channel can be obtained using eigendecomposition of the dynamical matrix (15) corresponding to the supermatrix M
Kraus representation (20) implies that the action of the extended channel on the second subsystem is independent from the action on the first subsystem. Using the representation of the composite system density matrix
one can show that it implies the following map
4 Passive eavesdropping in a noisy channel
As the application of the introduced description, we consider a simple model of quantum noise described by the depolarizing channel. Let us consider the situation in which Eve does not entangle with a signal qubit i.e. E AE = I AE . Such assumption results in the separation of the system controlled by Eve, so it is not taken into account in further expressions. From the map (22) it follows that the system state after the reception of the signal qubit by Alice reads
It follows from (8) that the probability of error occurrence in control mode is equal to
In the information mode the encoding operation leads to states
However, Eve's observation capabilities are limited only to travelling qubit A, thus she has to distinguish between states ρ µ (3)
BA . But ρ 0 (3)
A and, in consequence, I E = 0. Thus the noise gives no additional advantage to passively eavesdropping Eve. The qubit A in its way back to Bob again interacts with the environment so he receives the states
If Bob uses unambiguous discrimination, the bits are lost (measurement fails) with a probability [6] 
where the overlap of ρ µ
BA is given by
On the other hand, if Bob uses minimum error discrimination the observed bit error rate is equal to [4] 
Quantities QBER and QLOSS as a function of control mode failure probability (8) , which is a parameter directly accessible to communicating parties, are shown in Figure 1 . Both QBER and QLOSS do not scale linearly with P EC . Moreover, the functional form of the obtained scaling heavily depends on the parameters of the noise model used, thus the correct modeling of noise is of prime importance in the estimation of the protocol operation over non-perfect quantum channels.
Concluding remarks
The usefulness of the general method based on density operator analysis for ping-pong protocol operation has been presented. As the proof of concept the example of its application to the analysis of the protocol execution over depolarizing channel has been given. The analysis of a more complicated case of an active eavesdropping is left for future research. Although the method is more cumbersome than the approach used so far, it is more versatile as it permits an incorporation of different models of noise in a unified way and makes use of a well grounded theory of quantum discrimination in estimation of eavesdropper's information gain.
